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Abstract
Background: Analysing tumour architecture for metastatic potential usually
focuses on phenotypic differences due to cellular morphology or specific genetic
mutations, but often ignore the cell’s position within the heterogeneous substructure.
Similar disregard for local neighborhood structure is common in mathematical
models.
Methods: We view the dynamics of disease progression as an evolutionary game
between cellular phenotypes. A typical assumption in this modeling paradigm is that
the probability of a given phenotypic strategy interacting with another depends
exclusively on the abundance of those strategies without regard local heterogeneities.
We address this limitation by using the Ohtsuki-Nowak transform to introduce
spatial structure to the go vs. grow game.
Results: We show that spatial structure can promote the invasive (go) strategy.
By considering the change in neighbourhood size at a static boundary – such as a
blood-vessel, organ capsule, or basement membrane – we show an edge effect that
allows a tumour without invasive phenotypes in the bulk to have a polyclonal
boundary with invasive cells. We present an example of this promotion of invasive
(EMT positive) cells in a metastatic colony of prostate adenocarcinoma in bone
marrow.
Interpretation: Pathologic analyses that do not distinguish between cells in the
bulk and cells at a static edge of a tumour can underestimate the number of invasive
cells. We expect our approach to extend to other evolutionary game models where
interaction neighborhoods change at fixed system boundaries.
keywords: evolutionary game theory – go-vs-grow game – spatial structure –
heterogeneity – edge effect – EMT
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1 Introduction
The importance of heterogeneity within tumours is gaining ground as one of the most impor-
tant factors in the laboratory and clinic alike [1]. This heterogeneity exists at multiple scales,
each of which presents its own unique set of challenges. One form of phenotypic heterogene-
ity that has been widely studied was first described by Giese et al. [2] when they showed
that in gliomas migration and proliferation were mutually exclusive processes; motile cells
are unable to proliferate while they are moving and proliferating cells are unable to move
while they divide. This has been termed the Go or Grow dichotomy [3]. A proliferative
or autonomous growth (Grow) cell might switch to a motile or invasive (Go) cell either
through mutation, metabolic stress [4], undergoing the Epithelial-Messenchymal Transition
(EMT) [5], or some other mechanism. EMT is generally characterised by the loss of cell-
cell adhesion and a gain in in motility and invasiveness in tumour cells, and is one of the
hallmarks of several carcinomas such as prostate [6, 7], breast [8], and other ductal cancers
where pre-invasive neoplasms are constrained by architectural boundaries (edges) such as
the duct wall or basement membrane. Our goal in this work is to highlight the important
and overlooked role of such edges in the evolutionary dynamics of the competition between
Go and Grow cells.
Evolutionary Game Theory (EGT) is a mathematical approach to modeling frequency-
dependent selection where players interact strategically not by choosing from a set of strate-
gies but instead by using a fixed strategy determined by their phenotype. Given the evolu-
tionary nature of cancer [9, 10], EGT has been applied to study how the interactions between
different types of cells in a polyclonal tumour could drive the dynamics of a given cancer [11].
In its first application to oncology [12, 13], EGT was used to analyse the circumstances that
lead to coexistence of two phenotypes. Subsequent research [14] extended this idea to inter-
actions between three players in the angiogenesis problem. Gatenby and Vincent adopted a
game theory model heavily influenced by population dynamics to investigate the influence
of the tumour-host interface in colorectal carcinogenesis [15, 16] and suggested therapeutic
strategies [17]. Our own work, as well as that of others, has shown that EGT can be used to
study the conditions that select for more aggressive tumour phenotypes in gliomas [18, 19],
colorectal cancer [15, 16], multiple myeloma [20] and prostate cancer [21]. Furthermore, EGT
has been used to investigate the impact of treatment on cancer progression [22, 23, 24]. For
an in depth overview of the game theoretical approach to cancer, see Basanta & Deutsch
[11].
In this study, we introduce spatial structure into the canonical ‘go versus grow’ game [25,
26] in which proliferation and motility compete within a tumour. We use our direct spatial
approximation to consider a familiar scenario for conservation biology: the edge effect of an
ecological system (for example, a forest in landscape ecology) at a static boundary [27, 28, 29].
In tumour progression, this is analogous to a cancer cell surrounded entirely by other cancer
cells as opposed to constrained by a physical boundary, such as a basement membrane, organ
capsule, fibrous capsule, or blood vessel (see Figure 1). Note that we do not consider the
unconstrained, dynamically growing edge of the tumour.
The static boundaries studied in this article are exciting in and of themselves, since the
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Figure 1: An idealized image of a hypothetical tumour (Left), and a clinically
produced micrograph of a sarcoma under low power stained with Hematoxylin
and Eosin (Right). A tumour cell (blue cells in cartoon) has several different scenarios
that affect the architecture of its neighborhood geometry which we illustrate here. On short
time scales, cells in a solid tumours experience largely static neighbourhood architectures,
however, cells in the bulk of the tumour (turquoise in cartoon, and lower right box in the
sample image) have many more neighbors than cells against static boundaries (pink) like
an organ capsule (left close-up), fibrous capsule (left box in sample image), or blood vessel
(right close-up in cartoon, upper right box in sample image). This change in relative number
of neighbours affects evolutionary game dynamics. The boundary between the tumour and
healthy cells (yellow), while of interest, is a dynamic edge and not considered in this article.
evolutionary dynamics that occur at static boundaries govern progression past key cancer
stages: the change from in situ to invasive; locally contained to regional advanced growth;
and the dramatic shift from local to metastatic disease. The former situation occurs early
in the progression of most epithelial tumours, and it is commonly believed that it is at this
point when the Warburg effect occurs, pushing cells toward the glycolytic (acid producing)
phenotype which promotes invasion and motility - the so called ‘acid mediated invasion’
hypothesis [30, 31, 32, 18]. The latter situation occurs when tumours are up against blood
vessels and is likely the first opportunity for hematogenous dissemination, the first step in the
metastatic process [33]. Here, we show a striking change in the evolutionary game dynamics
from the tumour bulk to the tumour’s physical boundary (Figure 1). This study represents,
to our knowledge, the first attempt to understand the effects of changing neighborhood
structure on evolutionary game dynamics of tumours.
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2 Methods
2.1 Inviscid game for motility
To mathematically model the Go or Grow dichotomy [3] we considered the situation in which
the tumour is made of a population of rapidly proliferating cells capable of autonomous
growth (AG), along with a subpopulation which arises by a mutation or phenotypic change
which confers motility/invasiveness (INV) to tumour cells. The game has two parameters: c
represents the direct and indirect costs of motility incurred by cells with the INV phenotype
resulting from the reduced proliferation rate of motile/invasive cells [3] and b is the maximum
fitness a tumour cell will have under ideal circumstances when it does not have to share
space or nutrients with other cells. As the units of measure are arbitrary, the ratio c/b can
be considered alone to determine game theoretic dynamics. With INV as strategy 1 and AG
as strategy 2, the game’s payoff matrix is:
( INV AG
INV 1
2
b + 1
2
(b− c) b− c
AG b 1
2
b
)
. (1)
To understand the inviscid model [25], imagine two cells meeting at random in a resource
spot; for an inviscid population this probability depends only on the cells’ relative abundance
but for the structured populations considered later, the probabily of meeting again will be
higher. If both cells are INV (motile) then one cell stays in the resource spot (i.e. a location
that contains oxygen, glucose or other growth factors) and consumes the resources b, and the
other pays a cost, c, to move and find a new empty site where it can then find resource, for a
payoff b. If after a move, a motile cell only finds a new empty spot with probability r, then
the expected move payoff is rb − c. This can be captured as an indirect cost by adjusting
the cost to be c′ = c+ (1− r)b without introducing an extra parameter. As the cell that has
to move is chosen randomly from the two, the expected payoff for each cell is the average
of the no-move (b) and move (b − c) payoffs. On the other hand, if an INV cell meets an
AG cell then the INV cell will move, incurring the cost, c, before receiving the benefit, b,
for a total fitness (b− c). The AG cell, however, will stay and consume all the resources (b).
Finally, if two non-motile cells (AG) are in the same resource spot then they simply share
the resources, for a payoff of b/2.
2.2 Direct approximation of spatial structure
A standard assumption in EGT is a perfectly mixed (inviscid) population, in which every
cell in the population is equally likely to interact with every other cell [34]. This may be a
reasonable assumption in liquid tumours, but in solid tumours (or any other situation being
modeled) in which spatial structure is important, the validity of this assumption should be
questioned [35]. The current solution to this is to map analytic EGT cancer models onto a
lattice and run in-silico experiments to simulate the resulting Cellular Automaton [36, 37, 25]
In such cases, the choices of the specific microdynamics to simulate are arbitrary and often
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left up to convention and the modeler’s imagination, since direct empirical mechanisms at
such a precise level are often unknown. Further, explicitly solving complex spatial structures
is currently outside of existing mathematical tools, so computational approaches have to
sacrifice the analytical power and full theoretical understanding of pure EGT approaches.
On occasion, computational modelers restore some analytical power by making mathe-
matical approximations of the simulation that are already approximations of, or guesses at,
the tumour’s real spatial structure. To avoid this double approximation and to analytically
model how spatial structure effects evolutionary games in the limit of large populations and
weak selection, Ohtsuki & Nowak [38] derived a simple rule for taking a more direct first-
order approximation of any spatial structure. This approach is based on the technique of
pair-approximation [39, 40, 41] and is exact only for Bethe-lattices (infinite trees of constant
degree), but is highly accurate for any static structure where higher-order terms, like the
correlations between neighbours of neighbours, are negligible. For example, Ohtsuki and
Nowak concentrated on the application of their tool to k-regular random graphs, which are
locally tree-like and have negligible second-order and higher terms, but the transform can
be used more broadly. While real spatially structured biological populations, such as solid
tumours, can have non-negligible higher-order interactions, Ohtsuki and Nowak’s first-order
approximation is an improvement over the common inviscid assumption that still allows us
to explore a completely analytic model.
Given a game matrix A, one can compute the Ohtsuki-Nowak (ON) transform A′ =
ONk(A) and then recover the dynamics of the spatially structured game A by simply looking
at the inviscid replicator equation of A′. Here, we present the transform in a form that
stresses its important qualitative aspects:
ONk(A) = A +
1
k − 2(
~∆~1T −~1~∆T )︸ ︷︷ ︸
local dispersal
+
1
(k + 1)(k − 2)(A− A
T )︸ ︷︷ ︸
finite sampling from
death-birth updating
, (2)
where ~1 is the all ones vector and ~∆ is the diagonal of the game matrix A = [aij], i.e.
~∆i = aii; thus, ~∆~1
T (~1~∆T ) is a matrix with diagonal elements repeated to fill each row
(column). The first summand is the original payoff matrix. The second summand accounts
for the more common same-strain interactions that are a consequence of local dispersal.
The type of perturbation in the third summand was shown by Hilbe [42] to result from
finite sampling of interaction partners. The summands are not arbitrary, and emerge as a
whole from the pair-approximation technique. Our rationale forgrouping the summands in
this particular form is to help build intuition for equation 2. Effects of indirect interaction
from more distant cells could be introduced as further corrections to Equation 2, but would
require more assumptions about the tumour microstructure [41]. Since the local neighbour
relation is empirically well studied [43], the focus of the current study is incorporating only
this first-order structure into an EGT model of cancer dynamics.
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3 Results
Whenever b > c, the game in equation 1 is a social dilemma (like the Prisoner’s dilemma
or Hawk-Dove game, for a classification see [44]) with invasive cells as the cooperators, and
AG cells as defectors (mixing invasive and AG). Rules of thumb from EGT [45] suggest that
cooperators benefit from the structure of small interaction neighbourhoods, in agreement
with our biological intuition that, in this game, having the ability for conditional motion is
of more use in a more constrained and viscous environment than in one where all cells are
already stochastically moving around and interacting at random. We look at this formally by
explicitly considering spatial effects on the previously inviscid model. Applying the transform
from equation 2 to the game in equation 1 yields: 12b + 12(b− c) b 2k − 32(k − 2) − c 2k2 − k − 12(k − 2)(k + 1)
b 2k − 5
2(k − 2) + c
k + 3
2(k − 2)(k + 1)
1
2b
 . (3)
This game has three qualitatively different regimes that depend on the value of c
b
and k:
1. If k+1
k2+1
≥ c
b
then there is a single stable fixed point with all cells invasive. All polyclonal
tumors evolve toward this fixed point. For inviscid populations (k →∞) this condition
is satisfied only if motility is cost-free (c = 0) and hence the possibility of an all invasive
tumour was not noticed in previous non-spatial analysis [25].
2. If k+1
k2+1
< c
b
< k+1
2k+1
then the game has Hawk-Dove dynamics and there is a stable
polyclonal equilibrium with a proportion p of INV cells:
p =
b− 2c
b− c +
1
k − 2 −
1
(k + 1)(k − 2)
2c
(b− c) . (4)
All polyclonal populations will converge toward this proportion of INV cells. In the
unstructured limit as k →∞ we have perfect agreement with our previous results [25]
and recover the condition c
b
≤ 1
2
that was assumed for the inviscid equilibrium to exist
and the exact numeric value of b−2c
b−c for the equilibrium proportion of INV agents. For
any finite k, however, the proportion of invasive cells is strictly higher.
3. If k+1
2k+1
≤ c
b
then the game has Prisoner’s dilemma dynamics and any polyclonal pop-
ulation converges toward all AG and the tumor remains non-invasive.
These three regimes are plotted in Figure 2. When 1
k−2 = 0, we have the inviscid game and
for 1
k−2 = 1 we have the most structured regime possible with small neighbourhoods (k = 3).
The red region corresponds to a completely INV tumour, the yellow to a polyclonal tumour,
and the green to all AG. As we make the tumor more structured and reduce the number of
neighbours, it becomes easier for the INV cells to be expressed in the tumor.
For example, consider the case where c
b
= 0.53, and as in Figure 1, in the tumor away
from boundary (the teal cell) there are k = 8 neighbours and the dynamics favour all AG,
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Figure 2: Evolutionary game dynamics as a function of changing neighborhood
size and relative cost of motility. Here, we plot level of viscosity 1
k−2 versus relative
cost of motility c
b
. The parameter space is divided into three regions that correspond to
qualitatively different dynamics. In the red, the population evolves toward all INV; in the
yellow – toward a polyclonal tumor of INV and AG cells; and in the green the tumor remains
all AG. When 1
k−2 = 0 (i.e. k → ∞) we recover the standard inviscid replicator dynamics
of our previous work [25]. For 1
k−2 = 1 (k = 3, the top edge of the plot), we have the
environment with the smallest local neighbourhood to which the ON-transform applies. The
first horizontal dotted line marks k = 5 (pink cell in fig. 1) and the bottom line is k = 8
(teal cell in fig. 1). The left vertical dotted line is at c/b = 0.23, and shows that it is possible
to go from a polyclonal tumor in the bulk to a completely invasive population at a static
edge. The right vertical dotted lines shows that is possible to see a qualitative shift from all
AG to a polyclonal tumour in dynamics with the game fixed at c/b = 0.53 by decreasing k
from 8 and 5 (increasing 1
k−2 from 1/6 to 1/3) at the tumour boundary. Example dynamics
from a numerical solution of the replicator equation of the transformed game are shown in
the insets, where proportion of INV (p) is plotted versus time (t). The equation specifying
the dynamics is p˙ = p((ONk(G)~p)1 + ~p
TONk(G)~p) where ~p
T = (p , 1− p), G is the game in
eq. 1, and ONk is the transform from equation 2. The left inset corresponds to c/b = 0.23,
an initial proportion of invasive agents of p0 = 0.93, k = 5 (tumour edge) for the red line,
and k = 8 (tumour bulk) for the yellow. The right inset corresponds to c/b = 0.53, an initial
proportion of invasive agents of p0 = 0.04, k = 5 (tumour edge) for the yellow line, and
k = 8 (tumor bulk) for the green.
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so no INV cells will be present at equilibrium. For example replicator dynamics of this
condition, see the green line of the right inset. If the solid tumor is pressed up against a
static boundary then cells at the edge have fewer neighbours (e.g. k = 5, the purple cell)
and the dynamics at the boundary favour a polyclonal population with about 8% of the cells
INV. For example replicator dynamics of this condition, see the the yellow line of the right
inset. Notice that the tumours represented by the green (k = 8) and yellow (k = 5) lines
of the right inset have the same c/b = 0.53 and initial proportion of invasive cells p0 = 0.04
and yet the invasive phenotype is pushed to extinction in the tumour bulk (k = 8) but
stabilizes near potentially dangerous level of invasive cells (p = 0.08) at the tumour edge
(k = 5). Similar higher selection for invasiveness at the static edge is present for the more
competitive environment of c
b
= 0.23 in the left inset, but in this case we started the example
replicator dynamics at p0 = 0.93. In this case, we have a polyclonal tumour bulk (k = 8)
with p = 0.86 and convergence towards all invasive phenotypes at the static edge (k = 5). Of
course, the specific parameter values above are for illustrative purposes. Actual change in k
(just like c/b) will be experiment and geometry dependent – for example, we expect a more
drastic decrease in k for a convex rather than concave boundary. The main message is that
the edge effect can cause a polyclonal boundary in a tumor with a homogeneous all AG body.
And while not yet shown to be universally applicable, this is in qualitative agreement with
the experience of pathologists, such as the typical staining for motility (EMT) in Figure 3
where we see the bone marrow space entirely invaded by carcinoma cells (Pancytokeratin,
Left), but a stark difference in motile phenotype as illustrated by the nuclear staining by
SLUG, which is only present in high concentration in cells against the static boundary of
the bony trabecula.
4 Discussion
A standard assumption in evolutionary game theory is that all players interact with all
other players: the population is inviscid. There are a number of biological scenarios in
which such an assumption could be misleading, and we consider such a scenario in the form
several key aspects of solid tumour progression. The role of spatial heterogeneity has been
explored before in mathematical models studying evolutionary processes in cancer [46, 47,
48]. Those models show that different environments produce different selective pressures
and that phenotypic heterogeneity results from, and drives, the spatial one. Our approach
tackles a different question related to the nature of physical edges on cancer evolution for
which we have applied the Ohtsuki-Nowak transform [38] to the standard go-grow game
of mathematical oncology [25]. We have shown a quantitative effect: spatial-structured
tumours promote the invasive phenotype compared to inviscid tumours with the same ratio
of cost of motility to benefit of resources c/b.
We also considered the decrease in neighbourhood size experienced by cells at the static
boundary of a tumour, compared to cells within the tumour bulk. This could represent a
number of feasible and very relevant scenarios, including a tumour against a blood vessel,
organ capsule, or fibrous capsule; or an in situ neoplasm at the basement membrane. We
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Figure 3: EMT is found to be upregulated near static boundaries within bone
marrow in bony metastatic deposits of prostate cancer. In serial sections taken of
bony metastatic deposits of prostatic adenocarcinoma at rapid autopsy, staining for SLUG
is found to be increase near to the static boundaries created by the bony trabeculae. Nearly
homogeneous pancytokeratin staining (Left) reveals the ubiquity of metastatic carcinoma in
this sample. In the next slice, stained for SLUG (a marker of EMT), we see increased uptake
of the antibody in the carcinoma cells lining the static boundary, suggesting a more motile
phenotype (highlighted by arrows) as compared to those in the neighborhood representing
the tumour bulk.
have shown that this change in neighbourhood for tumour cells can, independently from
any other parameters, significantly effect the evolutionary stable strategies: in this case a
promotion of the INV phenotype. The edge effect allows a tumour that internally has no
invasive phenotypes expressed to have a polyclonal boundary with both invasive and non-
invasive cells, a scenario which is known to appear in several cancers, most notably prostate
[49] in the form of peri-neural invasion, and the recently described perivascular invasion in
melanoma [50] (previously called angiotropism). In each of these two scenarios tumour cells
express the motile phenotype, but only when against the physical structure in question.
Another recent result suggesting the importance of effects of changes in local architecture
is the work of Belmonte-Beitia et al. [51] in which the authors show that the dynamics of
motility change drastically at the grey-white interface in glioblastoma in ways that can not
be predicted by simply comparing the beheaviour in each zone individually.
The results of our mathematical model could have significant translational implications.
Genetic heterogeneity has recently become recognized as the rule in cancer [52], but as long
as physicians have had microscopes, we have realised that spatial organisational heterogene-
ity was an equally defining factor. The Gleason score [53] is a classic example of greater
heterogeneity predicting worse survival in prostate cancer. We have shown that a specific
change in neighbourhood size at a static boundary can dramatically alter game dynamics,
and select for novel phenotypes, and gives a rationale for working to understand within-
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tumour differences, not just at relatively long length scales [54], but also at architecturally
different locations at short length scales, which can be done with the advent of single cell
technologies and laser capture microdissection.
We have shown that the local spatial structure of a tumour can strongly affect the evo-
lutionary pressures on its constituent cells, even if all other factors are held constant. This
can add yet another source of sampling bias to tissue biopsies and suggests that the archi-
tectural, not just the molecular, context is important. For instance, consider an idealized
fine-needle aspiration biopsy [55], assuming the standard 0.7 mm needle samples a perfect
column around 20 cells in diameter of tumour cells right next to a critical boundary such
as a capillary. In our running example of c/b = 0.53 (see figures 1 and 2) this would re-
sult in the sample containing only about 0.4% invasive cells since 19 out of every 20 cells
are not at the boundary. This is below the detection levels of the state of the art medical
practice [56, 57]. However, the critical 1 out of every 20 cells at the boundary, would have
a dangerous 8% invasive cells. Thus, an oncologist performing a diagnostic fine-needle aspi-
ration biopsy could be led to think that a tumour poses a low risk for invasion/metastasis
because the technique destroys the local structure of the tumour and mixes the cells at the
critical tumour boundary with the (in this case) irrelevant tumour bulk.
Our model was motivated by the study of cancer, but the spatial edge effects in games of
interacting players that we investigate could represent any number of other scenarios. While
we have focused on the specifics of metastasis and cancer invasion, this method could yield
insights into many other interesting problems ranging from ecology to medicine, and high-
lights the importance of neighborhood geometry when studying the evolutionary dynamics
of competing biological agents.
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